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It is an humbling experience to sit in the place of the late
Dean Henry George McMahon. His vision and knowledge and
perception in the field of civil procedure are irreplaceable.
The great treatise he planned is forever lost. (Nevertheless, my
teaching of Louisiana civil procedure over the past academic
year has brought home to me that many of this wise scholar's
insights are perpetuated in the annotations in McMahon &
Rubin, Pleadings and Judicial Forms, Volumes 10 and 11 of
West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated. The practitioner will be
wise to check this source when confronted with a procedural
problem.')
Over a third of the thousand-odd appellate decisions re-
ported during the examined year concern one or more issues
of civil procedure. The bulk of the procedural points raised
were insubstantial and represented only unsuccessful tactical
maneuver. In the residue, stemming from ambiguities in our
procedural law or from misunderstanding with regard to the
application of the procedural principles represented by our
new Code of Civil Procedure, we will note only the more signi-
ficant or more common of the procedural issues raised, with
an occasional glance at the instructive example of pitfalls for
the harried and time-pressed practitioner.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Article 10 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that
otherwise-competent Louisiana courts have jurisdiction to adju-
dicate status in certain specified situations. The article's sub-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University (on leave of absence
1967-1968 from duties as Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third
Circuit).
1. Because such ephemeral publications are often not well preserved,
at this point it may be fitting to reproduce the February 1967 dedication
to the latest pocket parts of these works by Judge Alvin B. Rubin, co-author:
"There has been no greater figure in Louisiana procedure in this
century than Henry George McMahon. With typical modesty he signed
the volumes to which these pocket parts are enclosed merely as coauthor.
But he led the way in their concept, plan and execution. They would not
have existed without him."
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division 5 provides for status jurisdiction of proceedings "to
obtain the legal custody of a minor if he is domiciled in, or is in,
the state." (Emphasis added.) The provision thus apparently
recognizes that the simple physical presence of a child in the
state, irrespective of the child's legal domicile (i.e., that of his
parent or tutor 2), authorizes a Louisiana court to adjudicate the
child's custody; and the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
so held, unanimously, in Lucas v. Lucas.3 There, where the
children had been abducted from Mexico and brought to Lou-
isiana by the father, the mother unsuccessfully sought to dis-
miss the suit on the ground that the children were not legally
"in" Louisiana because she, the mother, had been awarded the
legal custody by a Louisiana court before she moved to Mexico
and established her domicile there.
Additionally, Lucas v. Lucas involved a perplexing venue
question, and on this the court divided 3-2. The mother had been
awarded custody by a Caddo Parish court before she moved
to Mexico. The father's attempt to regain custody (on allega-
tions of neglect and improper care) in Caddo had been rebuffed,
on the ground that a Louisiana court lacked jurisdiction, since
the children were then neither domiciled in nor present in
Louisiana.4 The father thereupon kidnaped the children and
brought them to his present Louisiana domicile in Rapides
Parish. The Code of Civil Procedure provides no specific venue
for custody proceedings brought independently of marital or
tutorship proceedings, although our jurisprudence does recognize
such a custody demand as an independent action.5 The dissent-
ing appellate judges believed that the Caddo Parish court
retained exclusive "jurisdiction" of custody, since by its initial
decree it had first obtained jurisdiction of the "res"-i.e., the
custody status. The court's majority, however, found Louisiana
jurisdiction over the absent defendant wife's person, since con-
structive service had been made upon her in the state in accor-
dance with forum law. It further found that Rapides Parish was a
proper venue. In the absence of specific regulation by other
statutory regulation, the proper parish of a suit against a non-
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 37 (1870).
3. 195 So.2d 771 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 539, 197
So.2d 81 (1967).
4. Cf. Nowlin v. McGee, 180 So.2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
248 La. 527, 180 So.2d 541 (1965).
5. See Thibodeaux v. Roscoe, 182 So.2d 77 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) and
decisions discussed therein. Such jurisprudential applications are criticized
by Professor Robert A. Pascal supra at 319.
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resident is governed by Code of Civil Procedure article 42, the
general venue provision. This provides for venue in any parish
which a nonresident defendant may be served. Since the non-
resident mother could be served in Rapides through an attorney
appointed to represent an absent defendant (when a court has
jurisdiction of the status), 6 the majority found the suit to be
properly brought in Rapides.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari, but in so
doing the majority did not express approval (or disapproval)
of the intermediate court's majority rationale. The per curiam
denial noted simply that the court of appeal "result" was correct
because "Mrs. Lucas made a general appearance when she filed
a peremptory' exception of res judicata at the same time she
filed the declinatory exception to the jurisdiction of the Court.'17
One should at this time note that the jurisdiction of Louisiana
courts was asserted by virtue of a status (custody)," not by
virtue of any presence or submission of the person of the
defendant wife to the Louisiana court's power to adjudicate.9
It would seem therefore that, once jurisdiction over the status
is recognized (i.e., despite the abduction of the minors), the
discussion of jurisdiction over the person or of waiver to objec-
tions to it is irrelevant: If the court does have jurisdiction
over the status, it necessarily has jurisdiction to render judg-
ment affecting the absentee with regard to the status, by mak-
ing him (her) a party through constructive service; if the
court does not have jurisdiction of the status (custody, in this
case), the decisions treat this lack as equivalent to a want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter,) which cannot ever be
waived or conferred by consent."
The Supreme Court's memorandum opinion denying cer-
tiorari, as well as some of the discussion in the intermediate
court's various opinions in the case, demonstrate a confusion
between "jurisdiction over the person" and "venue," one which
6. See LA. Con Civ. P. art. 5091 (1960).
7. 250 La. 539, 197 So.2d 81 (1967). Justice Sanders dissented on the
ground that the Caddo Parish court retained continuing exclusive intra-
Louisiana jurisdiction to modify its own custody decree.
8. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 10 (1960).
9. Id. art. 6.
10. Id. art. 2: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and
authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or
proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute,
or the value of the right asserted."
11. Id. art. 3. See Douglas v. Douglas, 146 So.2d 227 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).
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the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure was designed to clarify and
avoid.12 Article 6 provides that "jurisdiction over the person
is the legal power and authority of a court to render a per-
sonal judgment against a party to an action or proceeding,"
whereas under article 41 "venue means the parish where an
action or proceeding may properly be brought and tried." In
the present instance, therefore, the propriety of the Rapides
Parish Court as a forum concerned really a question of venue,
since it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and also of the
defendant's person (by virtue of its jurisdiction over the status
and constructive service on the defendant thereby authorized).
However, although incorrectly referring to a waiver of objec-
tions to "jurisdiction," the Supreme Court's memorandum opin-
ion correctly concluded that any objection to the venue of
Rapides Parish was waived by the filing of the peremptory ex-
ception. A dilatory exception, by which objections may be urged
both to venue and to want of personal jurisdiction, is waived
if a general appearance is made before it is overruled, 18 and the
filing of a peremptory exception is, with limited exception not
here pertinent, 4 a general appearance which does indeed waive
a simultaneously or previously filed declinatory objection.15 It
is to be noted that, in any event, the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari does not necessarily mean approval of the ruling
of the intermediate court's majority that Rapides Parish was
an appropriate venue for the custody proceeding, since due to
the defendant's waiver of objection by filing of the peremptory
exception the Supreme Court majority never faced the dissenting
judges' contention that Caddo alone remained the proper venue
12. McMahon, Jurisdiction under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
35 TUL. L. REV. 501 (1961).
13. LA. CODE COv. P. art. 928 (1960). See also note 15 infra.
14. Under id. art. 7, filing the peremptory exception with objections
to the jurisdiction is a general appearance unless "required by law." The
only instances in which peremptory exceptions are required to be filed with
all other exceptions is in courts of limited jurisdiction, where all
exceptions must be filed with the answer. Id. arts. 4892, 4922, and
5002; of. Mexic Bros. v. Sauviac, 191 So.2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966),
noted, 28 LA. L. REV. 291 (1968). The simultaneous filing of dilatory objec-
tions with the declinatory exception is always required by law, LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 928 (1960), so that the simultaneous filing of the dilatory exception
with the declinatory does not waive the latter. Id. art. 7.
15. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 7 (1960), which defines a general appear-
ance as being one made for other than certain specified limited purposes.
See also "Caveat," Annotation 1, Form 1001, 11 WEST, LSA, MCMAHON &
RUBIN, PLEADINGS AND JUDICIAL Forxms, form 1, Annot. 1, Caveat (1963).
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due to the continuing jurisdiction of the Caddo Parish Court to
modify its own custody decree.1
The several opinions of the courts in Lucas v. Lucas have
been discussed at this length not only because of the intrinsic
importance of the rulings as to jurisdiction and venue in child-
custody cases. In these early years of the application of the
concepts of the new Code of Civil Procedure, the conceptual
distinction between jurisdiction (over the person or otherwise)
and venue must not be confused. Similar imprecision of analysis
and lack of clarity in applying the related concepts resulted in
much confusion and in unsound jurisprudence which eventually
destroyed the utility of the old Code of Practice concept of
jurisdiction ratione personae, forcing the present Code to adopt
its present approach.17
Morrison v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. 8 represents a ruling
of some importance with regard to jurisdiction over nonresidents.
A Louisiana policyholder had obtained a fire policy from a
foreign insurer on a residence in Mississippi. When a fire loss
occurred, his suit to obtain payment in Louisiana courts was
dismissed in the lower courts on the ground that no procedural
statute authorized suit in Louisiana on a cause of action arising
outside Louisiana. 19 In reversing, the Supreme Court majority
opinion pointed out that, although it had been issued in Missis-
sippi to insure a Mississippi residence, nevertheless the policy
had been procured through a Louisiana agent (to whom the
policy was transmitted for delivery in Louisiana to the mort-
gagee, and who collected in Louisiana the initial premium for
the foreign insurer), and the policy provided for payment of any
policy loss in Louisiana (under a loss payable to a mortgagee
clause). The court weighed the interest of Louisiana in afford-
ing a forum remedy to its citizens for a cause of action growing
out of a Louisiana-connected business activity, against the rela-
tively little inconvenience to be caused the foreign insurer
16. If so, however, is this objection not more correctly termed an objec-
tion to the present suit because of the pendency of a prior action between
the same parties, LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 531 (1960), rather than an objection
to the venue as improper? Both objections are equally raised through the
declinatory exception, Id. art. 925(3), (4) and are similarly waived by filing
of the peremptory exception. See note 15 supra.
17. See McMahon, Jurisdiction under the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, 35 TUL. L. REV. 501, 502 (1961).
18. 249 La. 546, 187 So.2d 729 (1966).
19. See decision of intermediate court at 181 So.2d 418 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
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(against whom suit could under another statute have been
maintained in Louisiana for Louisiana-issued policies). The
court's majority then concluded that Louisiana courts could
exercise jurisdiction over the foreign insurer under what it
characterized as the "'Minimum Contacts' doctrine." The chief
importance of the decision is its refusal to characterize a cause
of action as Louisiana-based or not upon some technicality, such
as the place where the contract was "made," and in its broad
approach towards determining Louisiana jurisdiction on the
basis of the sufficiency of the Louisiana contacts weighed against
the relative inconvenience and unfairness to the defendant.
One other issue in the case deserves some comment. Al-
though the Supreme Court opinion reflects some confusion as
to this,20 the defendant insurer, which was authorized to do
business in Louisiana, accordingly had filed an instrument
appointing the secretary of state as its agent for service of
process "in any action or proceeding against such insurer," with
such appointment to "continue in force so long as any con-
tract or other liability of such insurer in this state shall
remain outstanding."'21 (Emphasis added.) The lower courts held
that this consent to be sued through substituted service extended
only to policies issued in Louisiana by virtue of the authorization
to do business here, which is conditioned upon the consent so
filed. After the trial court initially dismissed the suit on this
ground, the plaintiffs had had the defendant insurer served
again through the secretary of state under another statutory
provision authorizing such service on a cause of action "result-
ing from" a foreign corporation's business activity in this
state.22 Not only did the Louisiana Supreme Court hold that the
20. See 249 La. 546, 566, 187 So.2d 729, 736 (1966): "Defendant is licensed
to do business in Louisiana, but insofar as the record reflects it has no
lawful agent for service of process."
21. LA. R.S. 22:985 (1950). See also id. 22:983(A)(2). The pleadings of the
defendant insurer admitted that a consent to suit had been filed, but con-
tended that the consent was limited to suits arising out of Louisiana-issued
policies. See court of appeal record, Docket No. 1942, 4th Circuit, at Tr. 9-11.
22. Id. 13:3471(1) as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32; see also LA.
CODs Civ. P. arts. 1261, 1262 (1960). Also relied upon in the appellate courts
was LA. R.S. 22:1253(A) (1950), under which a foreign insurer which delivers
a policy to a Louisiana entity thereby appoints the secretary of state as its
agent for service of process in suits arising out of such policy. No attempt
was made to effect service through the Louisiana Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresidents Act, id. 13:3201-07, added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, perhaps
because the "nonresidents" within the reach of the enactment are statu-
torily defined so as to exclude foreign corporations licensed to do business
in the state. The difficulty the courts had in the present case to ascertain
which procedural statute applied so as to permit constructive service, of
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"business activity" through the policyholder's local insurance
agent permitted such substituted service upon the foreign
insurer.28 Also, apparently-and a more far-reaching decision-
the court held that substituted service could be made upon the
foreign insurer by virtue of its statutory consent to be sued,
despite the circumstance that the cause of action did not arise
out of the particular activities in Louisiana in connection with
which the insurer had filed its consent to be sued "in any action
or proceeding" against it.24 Query: Since the statutory author-
ization of service upon an agent exacted as a condition for a for-
eign corporation to do business in the state is not limited to
activities arising out of such business,25 to what extent does the
corporation's presence in Louisiana, together with its consent
through its unrestricted appointment of agent upon whom service
may be made, authorize suit in Louisiana in any transitory action
whatsoever against the defendant, whether based upon a Lou-
isiana-connected cause of action or not?2 6
Jurisdictional Venue
With regard to venue, our Code of Civil Procedure provides
for three types: (a) "jurisdictional" venue, which may never
be waived by the parties, (b) "preferred" venue (sometimes
termed "mandatory"), which in the event of conflict between
statutory provisions is a venue upon which an affected party
may insist by timely exception (but which may be waived by
failure to except timely); and (c) "permissive" venue, where
the plaintiff at his option may choose one of two or more venues
provided by the Code.2 Among the non-waivable jurisdictional
venues provided by article 44 is that providing for the court
the several arguably (but not concurrently) applicable, might indicate the
wisdom of broadening the definition of the 1964 statute so as to permit at
least one general catch-all nonresident statute under which service might
be made against any type of nonresident (individual, corporation, insurer
or not) in any type of suit.
23. I.e., by virtue of LA. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950), as amended, La. Acts
1960, No. 32, as a foreign corporation engaging in business activity in the
state.
24. 249 La. 546, 567, 187 So.2d 729, 736-37 (1966). The court specifically
held that LA. R.S. 22:985 (1950), cited in text at note 21 supra, reflects the
intention of the legislature to provide for substituted service in instances
such as the present.
25. As is also the case of a non-insured foreign corporation, which to
do business in Louisiana must appoint an agent for service of "any lawful
process" upon the corporation. LA. R.S. 12:202A (1950).
26. Note, 10 TUL. L. Rsv. 639 (1936). See also Comment, 26 LA. L. Rsv.
351, 354-60 (1966).
27. LA. CODE Crv. P. arts. 44, 45 (1960).
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in which a succession may be opened. 28 Emphasizing the im-
portance of the jurisdictional venues, in Succession of Guitar29
the court annulled a succession judgment and dismissed the
proceeding, where the court of its own motion noted that the
succession was opened in an incorrect venue, stating that
absence of jurisdictional venue in such instances is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and imports
absolute nullity to all proceedings. One of the other specified
jurisdictional venues is that of article 2006, the intention of
which is to require that an action to annul a judgment must be
brought in the trial court in which the original proceeding was
instituted. However, as a recent decision of the Second Circuit
illustrates,"° this venue provision relates only to actions to annul
judgments which are merely voidable or relatively null-as to a
judgment which is an absolute nullity, it is subject to colla-
teral attack at any time in any proceeding, wherever venued,
in which its validity is asserted in opposition to the party rely-
ing upon the judgment's absolute nullity.
ACTIONS
Codifying a jurisprudentially created procedure and bor-
rowing from the Federal Rules, articles 591-597 of our 1960
Code of Civil Procedure provide for a class action by which
one or more members of a class may sue or be sued on behalf
of all members, when the persons constituting the class are
so numerous as to make it impracticable for all of them to join
or be joined as parties. The Code action was first successfully
utilized when two prospective candidates by virtue of it were
able to secure a clarification of the election laws on behalf of
all other potential candidates at an election to be called.3 1
The period under review produced two decisions illustrating
limitations and judicial safeguards pertaining to the remedy.
In one, the plaintiff's right to a class action was denied where
the plaintiff's individual claim for relief predominated over the
alleged common interest.3 2 In dismissing the single plaintiff's
claim, the court noted that it was pertinent to consider, as well
as the suit's representative character, whether the number of
28. Id. art. 2811.
29. 197 So.2d 921 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
30. Board of Commissioners v. Hollybrook Land Co., 191 So.2d 724 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1966).
31. Burns v. Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee, 248 La.
203, 177 So.2d 576 (1965).
32. State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett, 194 So.2d 452 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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parties is sufficient as compared to the numerical size of the
class and whether other members have notice of the pendency
of the claim. The second decision, Verdin v. Thomas,5 concerned
a petitory action filed by fifty-nine plaintiffs on behalf of all
other heirs of certain decedents. The common interest of all the
heirs in claiming ownership of the property was held to be
sufficient basis for the institution of the class action, with the
court also finding that under the circumstances the action fairly
insured representation of all members of the class. Verdin v.
Thomas is also interesting in that it recognized the right of these
heirs to secure the appointment of a provisional administra-
tor to grant a mineral lease of the property in order to safe-
guard the interest of all claimants to the property,3 4 as well as
in that it involved court approval of a compromise of the claims
of all members of the class negotiated on their behalf by the
parties who brought the action.85
Under article 531 of the Code of Civil Procedure a defen-
dant may have all but the "first" suit dismissed when two or
more suits are pending in Louisiana courts on the same cause
of action between the same parties and having the same object.
In Landry v. Landry,36 the husband filed suit on a legal holiday
in the parish of matrimonial domicile, while the wife on the
following day filed suit in a nearby parish in which she had
established her separate domicile due to the husband's alleged
mistreatment of her. The court recognized that by statute
ordinary suits may not be filed on a legal holiday; but, revers-
ing the trial court, the appellate tribunal nevertheless sustained
the husband's exception of lis pendens and dismissed the sub-
sequent suit by the wife. The intermediate court reasoned
that nevertheless the husband's suit was already in the clerk's
office the very first moment of the next day (when it became
33. 191 So.2d 646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
34. LA. CODE0 Civ. P. art. 3011 (1960). The succession proceedings were
instituted as separate actions, tried and decided at the same time as the
subject suit. Succession of Billiot, 191 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
Succession of Billiot, 191 So.2d 653 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
35. Id. art. 594 provides that no class action may be compromised or
dismissed without court approval nor until after notice be given to other
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. In the present
instance, the court ordered public notice by advertisement in a public
newspaper in the parish, requiring interested parties to file a formal opposi-
tion before a court hearing set twenty days later. Docket No. 6718, First
Circuit Court of Appeal, Tr. 81-83. The court patterned its order upon the
provision requiring advertisement before compromise of succession claims
by a succession representative. Id. arts. 3198, 3229.
36. 192 So.2d 237 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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lawful to file suits), so that therefore it primed the wife's suit
even if hers was filed at the opening hour (9:00 A.M.) of her
clerk's office in the nearby parish.
At first blush, this approach may seem commonsensical and
accurate in analysis. On further reflection, however, the cir-
cumstance that one party may obtain unfair advantage over
the other by securing, through accommodation or friendship,
a legally unauthorized "first" filing suggests a too-mechanical
application of the Code provision, and one not required by it.
Furthermore, by statute some clerk's offices in the state are
authorized to open at 9:00 A.M., while all others are directed to
open at 8:00 A.M. 37 It would seem that one party's suit, filed with
all the haste possible, should not be primed by another as
"first" because filed in a parish with an earlier opening hour
merely because of the fortuitous circumstance of the place
of the suits; nor for instance because one clerk was early and
another tardy in opening his office. One might hypothesize that
all suits filed at opening hour might properly be considered
concurrently filed, since the Code of Civil Procedure requires
that the clerk of court note only the "date" of filing (not the
hour and minute),3s and since Civil Code articles regulating
analogous legal events are to this effect.39 At the very least,
the illegally filed suit might not be considered validly "first"
filed, just as where an illegally premature levy of execution,
though valid for certain purposes, is not allowed to prime a levy
by a law-observing judgment creditor who withholds execu-
tion during the legal delay.4
Possibly the problem is not of sufficient moment to require
legislative clarification. Nevertheless, a more functional inter-
pretation and application of article 531 by the courts might
avoid regarding mechanically as "first" a suit which is placed
37. LA. R.S. 13:756 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1966, No. 154.
38. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 253 (1960).
39. LA. CIVL CODE arts. 3358 (mortgages concurrent if inscribed on same
day), 3467 (time for prescription reckoned by days and not hours) (1870).
The former Civil Code provision was modified by statute to provide that
the date, hour, and minute should be inscribed on all acts importing
"mortgage or privilege," with the act to be effective from time of filing.
LA. R.S. 9:5141 (1950). However, when through Inadvertence three judg-
ments were filed on the same day without noting the minute and hour of
filing, the judgments were regarded as filed simultaneously and ranked
concurrently. Godchaux Sugars Inc. v. Boudreaux, 153 La. 685, 96 So. 532
(1923).
40. Kimber-Murphy Mfg. Co. v. Vestal, Inc., 43 So.2d 508 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1949).
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in a courthouse earlier merely through the fortuities of accom-
modation, or of prematurity or tardiness or differentness of
office hours.
Article 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
an action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step
in its prosecution for a period of five years. Burglass v. Wagues-
pack41 correctly notes that the consequent dismissal should be
without prejudice. Aside from the inconvenience of instituting a
second suit, the penalty for abandoning a suit by lack of prose-
cution is only that a second suit might be met by a plea of pre-
scription, since the abandoned suit's interruption is regarded
as erased by its abandonment.4 In Loftus v. Grain Dealers Mut.
Ins. Co.,43 the court held correctly that for purposes for com-
puting the five years within which an active step must be taken,
the determinative date is that of the minute entry fixing the
case for trial, not the trial date itself, which might for instance
be several months subsequent to the fixing, as in the cited case.
PARTIES
In its provisions relating to parties, the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure provides detailed regulation of "proper" parties
plaintiff and defendant. The thrust of these provisions is to
assure (1) that the real parties in interest will be afforded a
remedy and be bound by the litigation, (2) that a defendant
may not be vexed by multiple or unauthorized suits, and (3)
that judicial administration may have clear guidelines to deter-
mine at the threshold of litigation the procedural capacity of
parties to prosecute or defend a suit and to stand in judgment
which will be binding on the interests involved in the litigation.
These Code articles perform a useful purpose when they are
interpreted and applied in accordance with their function. How-
ever, as will be seen, on occasion harsh substantive results and
traps for the unwary may obtain, not required by the function
41. 187 So.2d 489 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). The court noted that its
decision was in conflict with that of the First Circuit in LeBlanc v. Thibo-
deaux, 162 So.2d 753 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964). The latter decision without
comment dismissed the action without prejudice, which was erroneous (see
text at note 42 infra) but not prejudicial in the decided case, since upon
dismissal as abandoned for non-prosecution for five years the tort cause of
action was prescribed by failure to file timely suit within the year. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 3536 (1870).
42. LA. CIVIL CODs art. 3519 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30;
cf. City of New Orleans v. Westwego Canal & Terminal Co., 206 La. 450,
19 So.2d 201 (1944).
43. 195 So.2d 747 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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of these articles, when they are applied mechanically and
literally and without consideration of their limited technical
purpose.
Typical of the sort of "which shell is the pea under" game
that can be played with proper-party questions is where a hus-
band and wife file suit, and then at the trial or on appeal it is
determined that the particular claim asserted in the name of
one spouse should technically have been asserted in the name
of the other under substantive community property law. On
technical analysis, the defendant obligor, although actually with-
out interest in whether the husband or the wife collects the debt,
is sometimes permitted to escape liability to either. A typical
such fact situation is presented by Gebbia v. City of New Or-
leans,44 but there the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to play
the shell game. A wife had sustained personal injuries by reason
of a premise defect. She and her husband sued the premise
occupier interests for damages. The court of appeal judgment
had affirmed recovery, but it had deleted an award of $120 for
the wife's wages for which the wife had sued, noticing of its
own motion that this is a community claim for which the hus-
band is the proper party plaintiff. Granting certiorari, the Su-
preme Court reinstated the award of lost wages to the wife. In
so doing, the court characterized the issue as being one of pro-
cedural capacity to sue for a community claim, a defense which
must be urged by threshold exception or is otherwise waived,
rather than being a want of interest which the courts may note
and act upon at any time, even on appeal. Similarly, on authority
of Gebbia, the court of appeal in Polk v. New York Fire &
Marine Underwriters45 rejected an attempt on appeal to delete
an award of $250 to the husband for automobile damage asserted
as a community claim, where the evidence showed the vehicle
had been acquired by the wife as a gift and was therefore tech-
nically her separate property. In both of these instances the
courts refused to permit the often-shadowy distinction between
a want of interest and a lack of procedural capacity to deter
them from affirming an award of proven damages sustained by
one of the spouses, although asserted by the other in a suit joined
by both spouses. Since both spouses had joined both suits, there
was no possibility of double recovery or multiple suit against
either defendant, nor was there any serious question of the suing
44. 249 La. 409, 187 So.2d 423 (1966), annullng 181 So.2d 292 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965), noted 27 LA. L. REv. 823 (1967).
45. 192 So.2d 667 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
spouse being unauthorized to do so by the spouse with the real
interest in the particular item of damages claimed. Undoubtedly
this circumstance influenced the courts toward their resolution
of the question in accordance with substantive justice.
The position taken by the courts might present some con-
ceptual difficulty, however, if suit for the same item had been
brought by separate suits by the different spouses, and it was
discovered only at the trial (as in the Polk case above) of one
suit or the other that in truth one spouse rather than the other
had the sole actual interest under substantive law. Under the
cited cases, technically, if the procedural incapacity of the wrong
spouse is not timely raised, that spouse's recovery cannot be
denied because of his want of interest, and the defendant may
theoretically be exposed to dual recovery. This sort of prospect
is so unlikely, that the courts may nevertheless be applauded
rather than condemned for refusing to apply a proper-party
article so as to pervert substantive result, when the true function
of the article is only to prevent multiple or unauthorized recov-
ery and to expedite judicial administration of law suits. Under
the circumstances of the decisions, where both spouses were
joined as parties, perhaps less troublesome conceptually might
have been a denial of the defendant's right to question one
spouse's incorrect assertion of the other spouse's right because
the defendant could not possibly be prejudiced and therefore, on
appeal, was without interest to urge application of a proper party
article in order to change the substantive result, when no func-
tional purpose of the proper party article is served; or perhaps,
in legalese, to have rejected the improper party plaintiff con-
tention on some theory of interspousal agency or authorization
to assert, or estoppel to question assertion of, the claim through
the "wrong" spouse. If this alternative rationale were followed,
instances where in fact potential prejudice might exist because
of non-joinder of other spouses with non-prescribed claims to
the interest asserted by the wrong spouse, the appropriate reso-
lution of a claim of improper party plaintiff might be by per-
mission to amend for purposes of adding or substituting the
proper party, or by remand for such purpose, instead of by
an outright dismissal of a claim which might be well-founded
46. Such amendment should relate back to the date of filing the original
pleading. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1153 (1960).
[Vol. XXVIII
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as a matter of substantive law and was timely instituted, though
by the wrong party.4
The cases discussed reached sound results. However, in two
other instances during the examined period, mechanical appli-
cation of proper-party provisions accomplished ends hard to
justify as ideal procedural justice. Butler v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.45 concerned a tort suit by a father as administrator
of his then-minor daughter's estate. Although no motion to sub-
stitute was ever made, the evidence at the trial revealed that
at the time of the trial the daughter had reached majority. As
a matter of substantive law, the father's administration of the
child's estate automatically ceases at a child's majority,4 9 so
that the child as a competent major becomes the proper party
to sue.50 Following prior jurisprudence, the appellate court sua
sponte noticed that the appeal by the father had not been taken
by the proper party, and it therefore dismissed the child's appeal
for an increase in damages. To avoid this result, a Louisiana
State Law Institute committee has recommended statutory re-
vision so as to provide, once a suit is instituted by and between
proper parties, that all subsequent steps taken by them shall
be deemed valid until formal request for substitution of proper
successors is made. Perhaps even without statutory change, the
same result might be reached by a liberal interpretation of Code
of Civil Procedure article 807, permitting continuance of an
action by or against a party who "transfers" an interest until
such time as substitution of proper party is made;51 this appli-
cation of article 807 will likewise have the effect of interpreting
the proper-party provisions so as to limit them to their intended
function of clarifying proper representation of incompetent or
non-individual parties at the time suits are initially instituted.
Again, in Younger v. American Radiator & Standard San. Corp.,52
mechanical application of the proper-party articles may have
produced harsh substantive results not required by the func-
tional purpose of the statutory provisions. Since the writer
47. See, e.g., Douglas v. Haro, 214 La. 1099, 39 So.2d 744 (1949); Lafleur v.
National Life & Health Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 838 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966);
Nettles v. Great American Ins. Co., 155 So.2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 244 La. 1024, 156 So.2d 227 (1963).
48. 195 So.2d 314 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
49. LA. CVIM CODE art. 221 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1924, No. 197.
50. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 682 (1960).
51. This was the approach taken in Nettles v. Great American Insurance
Co., 155 So.2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 224 La. 1024, 156 So.2d
227 (1963).
52. 193 So.2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 368, 195
So.2d 644 (1967).
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agrees with the excellent casenote in this issue of the Law
Review discussing the decision,58 no further analysis will be
made here.
In Hy-Grade Investment Corp. v. Robillard,54 the court did
not even discuss the possible pertinence of a proper-party
article, perhaps to avoid the conceptual problem or harsh sub-
stantive result which sometimes follows from such an article's
application of situations not within its functional scope. Code
of Civil Procedure article 687 provides that a "person" doing
business under a trade name is the proper party to enforce a
right growing out of such business, and "persons" include cor-
porations as well as individuals and all other entities.5 5 The
plaintiff in the suit was incorporated as "Hy-Grade Investment
Inc.," although it did business under the name of "Hy-Grade
Investment Corp.," under which latter name it filed suit. On
the defendant's exception, the trial court dismissed the suit, find-
ing there was no such legal entity. The intermediate court
reversed, basing its rationale on a Civil Code article permitting
the courts to disregard a "slight alteration" in a corporate name.5 6
In the absence of this statutory authorization, another acceptable
rationale might have been not to dismiss the suit, but instead
to permit amendment for substitution of the proper party plain-
tiff, since this is permissible under the Code of Civil Procedure's
amendment articles; 57 while, at the same time, this result would
accomplish the restricted purpose of the proper-party articles,
which is not to defeat a cause of action but only to insure that
it is enforced by the proper parties in conclusive litigation.
EXCEPTIONS
The 1960 Code announced: "Three exceptions and no others
shall be allowed: the declinatory exception, the dilatory excep-
53. See 4nfra Note, 28 LA. L. REV. 479 (1968). The writer may state,
as a dissenting member of the court which decided the case, that neither
the majority nor the dissenters had analyzed the issue as actually concern-
ing substitution and amendment rather than proper-party, as did the note-
writer. Had we done so, perhaps the entire court could unanimously have
reached a result opposite to that which we did on our (incorrect, I now
believe) analysis of what was the issue in the case.
54. Hy-Grade Inv. Corp. v. Robillard, 196 So.2d 558 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967). See also Capital Loans, Inc. v. Stassi, 195 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 889, 199 So.2d 912 (1967), and discussion at note
68 infra.
55. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 5251 (12) (1960).
56. LA. CIVIL CODE: art. 432 (1870).
57. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1153 (1960).
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tion, and the peremptory exception." (Emphasis added.) By
this provision it was intended to abolish the thirty-odd separate
exceptions previously recognized and to reduce their number
to three. The grounds of the previous exceptions were now rec-
ognized as "objections" which might be urged by one or the
other of the three recognized exceptions. The classification of
the objections as declinatory, dilatory, or peremptory is actually
based in borderline instances on historical rather than analytical
grounds, and as Professor Donald Tate noted in last year's faculty
symposium there are conceptual and practical difficulties in
administering the Code's exception scheme.59 The present writer's
further observation is that the bench and bar and reported
appellate opinions continue to speak of peremptory exceptions
of no cause of action, res judicata, etc., of a declinatory exception
of improper venue, etc., and of a dilatory exception of vagueness,
etc., rather than talking of a peremptory exception urging ob-
jections of no cause of action and res judicata, a declinatory
exception urging improper venue, or a dilatory exception based
on the objection of vagueness. No great harm is done by con-
tinuation of the old custom, but it is perhaps further evidence
that tradition and history rather than thoughtful procedural
device predominate in this field of our law, even as clarified by
the great McMahon analyses over the past several decades.
A sound procedural reform of the 1960 Code abolishes the
blanket-objection and requires an exceptor to allege with par-
ticularity the objections urged by his exception.00 There are
obvious benefits in such notice expediting prior preparation for
hearing and immediate disposition thereafter, but the require-
ment is not so rigid as to prevent subsequent amendment to
amplify previously pleaded declinatory or dilatory objections
or to add new peremptory objections.01 However, while all ob-
jections to be raised by the declinatory or the dilatory exception
must be filed simultaneously and prior to answer or the entering
of a preliminary default,62 the grounds, original or supplemental,
to be urged by the peremptory exception may be raised at later
58. Id. art. 922.
59. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term
--Civil Procedure, 27 LA. L. REV. 540, 544-47 (1967).
60. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 924 (1960).
61. Id. art. 1152. The restriction prevents adding new objections to the
dilatory or the declinatory exception, so as to string out the filing of such
objections in derogation of the Code scheme of preclusion of further such
objection after the initial pleading stage.
62. Id. art. 928.
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stages of the proceedings. The tardy or careless pleader of a
peremptory objection should nevertheless give some considera-
tion to the limits which might prevent his obtaining considera-
tion of late-pleaded objections or delayed clarification of those
previously filed but not well articulated.
Thus, in Abramson v. Piazza63 the appellate court, referring
obliquely to the rule that in pleading objections of prescription
by the peremptory exception the pleader may not plead pre-
scription generally but must specifically plead the particular
prescription relied upon, 4 held that pleas relying upon certain
prescriptions specified by cited Civil Code articles had not been
timely filed since peremptory objections must be pleaded in the
trial court "prior to a submission of the case for decision."65
(However the delay in specification was not prejudicial in the
cited case, because the court affirmed judgment in the pleader's
favor by sustaining a plea of acquisitive prescription timely filed
as founded on another Civil Code article.) Even though not filed,
timely or not, a trial or appellate court does have discretionary
power to notice of its own motion certain peremptory objections
(not prescription or res judicata, which must be specially
pleaded),66 while under another Code provision an appellate
court always "may consider the peremptory exception filed for
the first time in that court, if pleaded prior to a submission of the
case for a decision, and if proof of the ground of exception
appears of record. '67 (Emphasis added.) However, as noted in
Capitol Loans, Inc. v. Stassi,6 s when the peremptory exception
63. 198 So.2d 565 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
64. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3463, 3464 (1870). See also Succession of Drysdale,
130 La. 167, 57 So. 789 (1912); James F. O'Neil Co. v. Calhoun, 144 So.2d 151
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), and Neilson v. Haas, 199 So. 202 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940). During the period reviewed, in one decision a court refused to con-
sider a two-year prescription not pleaded, although the one-year prescrip-
tion actually pleaded sought to prevent recovery on allegations of fact suffi-
cient to justify application of the former but not the latter prescription.
Consolidated Loans, Inc. v. Smith, 190 So.2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
65. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 928 (1960). However, as noted in Capital Loans
Inc. v. Stassi, 195 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), the appellate court may
under article 2163 exercise discretion to consider a peremptory exception
filed in the trial court too late for the latter's consideration.
66. Id. art. 927.
67. Id. art. 2163.
68. 195 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 889, 199
So.2d 912 (1967). The exception was based upon a proper-party issue such
as is discussed in the text accompanying notes 46 through 57 supra. The
owner of the note sued upon was the "Capital American Acceptance, Corp.,"
although suit was brought and new trial applied for in the name of "Capital
Loans, Inc.," a subsidiary corporation. The trial court permitted amend-
ment and substitution of the correct party, and the appellate court rejected
the contention that the motion for the new trial was void (and hence the
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is first pleaded in the appellate court, that court may exercise
its Code-grounded discretion not to consider the exception.
Succession of Guidry v. Bank of Terrebonne & Trust Co.69
reversed a trial court's dismissal of a suit and its refusal to
permit amendment to cure the ground of the peremptory excep-
tion sustained which resulted in the dismissal. In so ruling, by
forceful statement the appellate court expressed the effect of
the procedural reform represented by article 934 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. "[W]here the ground of a peremptory ex-
ception may be removed by amendment, no discretion is vested
in the trial court to grant or deny time for amendment. In such
instances the trial court must afford time for amendment."' 0
The Peremptory Exception Raising the Objection of No
Cause of Action (alias the Exception of No Cause of Action)
The exception urging the objection of no cause of action
is equivalent to the common law demurrer to the pleadings.71
It performs the useful function of permitting determination on
the pleadings alone, without evidence, whether the law affords
a remedy (cause of action) to anyone for the grievance alleged
by the plaintiff. The exception was properly overruled in an
excellent opinion in Roloff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co..72 where in
a suit against an insurer the court refused to permit a policy
defense by means of the exception. The court also affirmed the
dismissal of the action on motion for summary judgment, a pro-
cedural device which (unlike the exception) does permit con-
sideration of factual defenses outside the pleadings. The tech-
nicality of the different procedural methods by which defenses
may be raised is properly a matter to be questioned intellectual-
ly,73 but the procedural scheme of Louisiana practice now en-
visions one trial on the merits and one appeal rather than
appeal was late) because not applied for by a party with real interest (since
the proper party to plead was the other corporation). In the writer's view,
the action of both courts was correct in refusing to apply a proper-party
article so as to produce substantive results beyond the procedural scope of
the article's function, and in regarding the difference in nomenclature as
harmless error which could not prejudice the defendant, because, suing on
the single note and agreement in question, the two corporations "were essen-
tially one and the same, particularly insofar as the defendant was concerned."
Id. at 672.
69. 193 So.2d 543 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
70. Id. at 548.
71. McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action, 9 TUL. L. Rsv. 17
(1934).
72. 191 So.2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
73. See note 59 supra.
404 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
piecemeal trials and appeals. This fundamental conception will
be thwarted unless the various procedural devices are restricted
to their intended function, as so clearly instanced by the Roloff
decision.
Thus, although evidence received without objection may be
considered in disposing of the peremptory exception at a hearing
prior to trial,74 yet the exception based on no cause of action
may not be urged after evidence is introduced at the trial on
the merits: Its function is limited to testing the sufficiency of
the pleadings prior to the trial and does not encompass testing
the sufficiency of the evidence educed at the trial to prove the
properly pleaded cause of action, as held in Joseph v. Tri-Parish
Flying Service.7 5 The court there cited well-established juris-
prudence to the effect that motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict, directed verdicts, and demurrers to the evidence are
procedural devices which Louisiana law has until now deliberate-
ly rejected, so that the no cause of action exception cannot be
used to introduce these concepts disguised under its nomencla-
ture. Nor, because of this general approach of Louisiana pro-
cedural law, may a party expand the scope of the no cause of
action exception so as to secure its application on the basis of
evidence permissibly introduced in support of another peremp-
tory objection or exception, since evidence admitted pre-trial
in support of other motions or objections may not be considered
in the determination of the exception of no cause of action,7 6 at
least if objected to.7 T Thus, in view of the limited function of
the exception, the court erred in dicta in Stamper v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co. 78 inferring that the exception raising the
objection of no cause of action could be sustained after trial;
the proper disposition then is by judgment dismissing the
demand on the merits. 79
The general rule is that, for purposes of determining the
exception raising the objection of no cause of action, all well-
pleaded facts of the petition and any annexed document must
be accepted as true, with all doubts being resolved in favor of
74. Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So.2d 406 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So.2d 481 (1964).
75. 201 So.2d 321 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
76. Gros v. Steen Production Service, Inc., 197 So.2d 356 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967).
77. Bielkiewicz v. Rudisill, 201 So.2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
78. 187 So.2d 134 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
79. Kline v. Dawson, 230 La. 901, 89 So.2d 385 (1956); cf. Fister v. Fister,
131 So.2d 103 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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the sufficiency of petition alleging a cause of action.80 Loeb v.
Badalamenti8i is a reminder that, while usually the facts are
considered sufficiently well-pleaded if evidence broadly admis-
sible under the general allegations can prove a cause of action, 2
nevertheless, where fraud is an element, the cause of action is
not well-pleaded by general allegations, for the Code provides
that the factual circumstances constituting fraud must be alleged
with particularity.8 3 In sustaining the objection of no cause of
action to a petition containing only general allegation of fraud,
the court also noted that certain recorded deeds found in the
record could not be considered, since not annexed to (and there-
fore part of) the petition8 4 and since no evidence may be intro-
duced over objection at the trial of the exception urging no cause
of action.8 5
Dean McMahon once wrote that "the distinction between
the functions of the objections of no right, and of no cause, of
action [is] never material except when evidence is sought to be
adduced on the trial of the exception."8 6 In his classic clarifica-
tion of the functions of the two exceptions, he had earlier writ-
ten that the exception urging no right of action "is employed
(in cases where the law affords a remedy) to raise the question
as to whether plaintiff belongs to the particular class in whose
exclusive favor the law extends the remedy, or to raise the issue
as to whether plaintiff has the right to invoke a remedy which
the law extends only conditionally. 87 Borderline cases are pre-
sented where a defendant alleges that because of some defense,
available to the defendant uniquely against the plaintiff, the
plaintiff no longer belongs to the particular class in whose favor
the case of action exists. However, the prevalent view of the
Louisiana cases is that the objection of no right of action is not
available to urge such a defense to the effect that the plaintiff
80. Elliott v. Dupuy, 242 La. 173, 135 So.2d 54 (1961).
81. 192 So.2d 246 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 24, 193
So.2d 530 (1967).
82. West v. Ray, 210 La. 25, 26 So.2d 221 (1946); Babineaux v. Southeast-
ern Drilling Corp., 170 So.2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
83. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 856 (1960).
84. Id. art. 853.
85. Id. art. 931. See Maggio v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 102 So.2d
505 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958), for summary of jurisprudence under La. Code
of Practice (1870) concerning limited admissibility of documentary evidence
at such trial.
86. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-64 Term
-Civil Procedure, 25 LA. L. RE v. 433, 438 (1965).
87. McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action, 9 TUL. ", REv. 17,
29-30 (1934).
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is without interest simply because the defendant has a defense
to the plaintiff's action, so in these cases the objection is over-
ruled and the defense so urged is not tried piecemeal by the
exception but is instead relegated to the general trial on the
merits along with all other factual defenses to the cause of
action alleged by the petition.88
Under this analysis, Pappas v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. 8 9
during the reviewed period incorrectly sustained an objection
of no right of action. The petition alleged a cause of action
against the defendant's insurer. The insurer excepted, urging
no right of action in the plaintiff because of his refusal to fur-
nish medical reports as required by the policy. The evidence
to such effect is, under the prevalent jurisprudence, in reality
a defense to the cause of action. The blurring of the distinction
between the objections of no right and of no cause of action
is a cause of concern in administering Louisiana's procedural
policy against fragmentary trials of merit-issues of litigation,
however sensible the result may be in a particular instance. In
extenuation of the decision, it appears that the real issue was
chiefly a matter of law, that neither of the parties questioned
the propriety of the trial of the issue by the objection of no
right of action, that the same result could have been reached by
admission without objection of the same evidence on trial of an
objection of no cause of action, and that also the issue, essen-
tially uncontested factually, could have been raised and tried
in advance of the merits by a motion for summary judgment.
Review of Decision Overruling Exception
The general rule is that a judgment overruling an excep-
tion is not appealable, 90 nor is a judgment which merely sus-
tains an exception without at the same time determining the
88. Cattle Farms, Inc. v. Abercrombie, 244 La. 969, 155 So.2d 426 (1963)
(title defects in the plaintiff's claim); Wischer v. Madison Realty Co., 231 La.
704, 92 So.2d 589 (1956) (quitclaim by plaintiffs to defendants inadmissible
on trial of exception of no right of action, because this was a factual defense
to a cause of action and was not evidence to plaintiff's right or not to sue
as being or not being in the general class of persons in whom the cause of
action is vested); Roloff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So.2d 901 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966) (policy defense not raisable by defendant insurer under no
right of action); Leteff v. Maryland Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 80 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1955) (policy defense not triable by no right, faction, objection; full discus-
sion).
89. 191 So.2d 658 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
90. Lounsberry v. Hoffpauir, 199 So.2d 553 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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merits and disposing of the suit.9 1 The reason, of course, is that
in general only final judgments are appealable, 2 and judgments
rulings on exceptions are usually interlocutory" unless at the
same time they accomplish a dismissal of the suit. Two decisions
with regard to application of this principle present interesting
demonstrations of the judicial process in action; but so to show
requires first a statement of preliminary context.
In 1962 the Louisiana Third Circuit, relying upon an earlier
jurisprudential misapplication, refused in LaFleur v. Dupuis94
to review the correctness or not of a trial court's sustaining of
an exception of vagueness, even though actually the appeal was
from a final judgment of dismissal when the plaintiff declined
to amend to cure the vagueness (i.e., not from the interlocutory
judgment sustaining the exception of vagueness and ordering
amendment). In reviewing the appellate decisions for the year
Dean McMahon noted that the erroneous result overlooked the
rationale for the procedural rule invoked, commenting: "The
reason for the prohibition against an appeal from an interlocu-
tory judgment which does not cause irreparable injury is not
to preclude any appellate review thereof, but rather to prohibit
fragmentary appeals. An interlocutory order which causes no
irreparable injury is reviewable under the appeal taken from
the final judgment in the case. The interlocutory order in Dupuis
requiring amendment of the petition should have been reviewed
under the appeal from the final judgment dismissing the suit."95
Whereupon, when faced recently with decision of the identical
question in Washington v. Flenniken Const. Co.,9 6 the Third
Circuit overruled its earlier decision in Lafleur v. Dupuis in a
re-analysis of the issue based upon Dean McMahon's critique
of the case, thus affording to a true believer in the Louisiana
civil law some support to the contention that doctrinal writings
are more relied upon than mere case precedent in Louisiana as
in other civilian jurisdictions.
But, lest the reader relax and prepare to attend to his pop-
91. Succession of Dancie, 187 La. 628, 175 So. 418 (1937); Mann v. Eden-
born, 185 La. 154, 168 So. 759 (1936); Sonnier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 So.2d
694 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
92. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2083 (1960).
93. Id. art. 1841, sets forth the theoretical distinction between final and
interlocutory judgments.
94. 147 So.2d 724 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
95. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court8 for the 1963-64 Term,
25 LA. L. REv. 291, 310-11 (1965).
96. 188 So.2d 486 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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corn in the expectation that Pauline (the true doctrine) has
finally escaped the clutches of Dangerous Dan (the Lafleur v.
Dupuis misapplication), there is yet another episode to this
dramatic serial of the judicial process. Another Louisiana cir-
cuit was faced with a similar issue in People of the Living God
v. Chantilly Corp.,97 where the plaintiff appealed from the
dismissal of its suit when it failed to amend its petition in com-
pliance with an order sustaining an exception of improper cumu-
lation of actions. The appellate court refused to review the ques-
tion of whether the trial court was correct in maintaining the
exception, holding that the only question on appeal was the right
and power of the trial court to dismiss the suit when the appel-
lant did not comply with its order to amend; the court held
that the correctness of the order itself was not before the court
for review. The opinion cited Lafleur v. Dupuis, that decision's
lone precedent, and a Third Circuit decision decided shortly
after Lafleur which followed its application. To the non-believer,
this might afford some support to the contention that in Lou-
isiana, as in many American common law jurisdictions, case
law predominates over doctrine as the guideline to decision. To
the unkind, perhaps, the decision might simply illustrate de-
ficiency in analysis and research under any system of law, since
even rudimentary shepardizing leads to the doctrinal criticism
of Lefleur v. Dupuis (Dangerous Dan) and further indicates
that the court which rendered it overruled it by the cited Wash-
ington decision (Pauline). Fortunately, the Louisiana Supreme
Court was given the opportunity to grant certiorari,98 and on
review reversed the intermediate court's decision in People of
Living God v. Chantilly Corp.9 and ruled in accord with Dean
McMahon's views and the Washington decision, which the Su-
preme Court cited. Dangerous Dan is laid to rest and Pauline is
safe at last (we hope).
MOTIONS
Article 963 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that a court may grant an order ex parte if it is one the
mover is "clearly entitled [to] without supporting proof." On
its face, this guideline is not very definite; it affords flexibility in
working out applications according to the varying circumstances
and the jurisprudential development over the years. In State
97. 197 So.2d 748 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
98. 250 La. 982, 200 So.2d 666 (1967).
99. 207 So.2d 752 (La. 1968).
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ex rel. Stevens v. Babineaux'0 0 the defendant obtained ex parte
the annulment of an interlocutory judgment, on allegations and
a showing that such interlocutory order had itself been obtained
improperly and essentially without notice. Granting supervisory
writs, the court of appeal annulled the order, pointing out that,
whenever there are serious questions of law or fact, a motion
should be first served on the opposing party and then tried con-
tradictorily with him. It is to be noted that the thrust of the
decision is to require a contradictory hearing even though there
is a substantial showing of the invalidity or unfairness or ex
parte nature of the initial order attacked by the subsequent
motion: The first flouting of article 963 by an ex parte order
does not ordinarily permit a second flouting by ex parte annul-
ment, the remedy rather being more careful initial observance
of the Code requirement by bench and bar.
Since the 1960 Code introduced the motion for summary
judgment into our procedure, 10 1 the annual faculty symposium
has on several occasions noticed its heavy-handed use beyond
its scope to short cut litigation without the normal trial. The
function of the device is chiefly to decide issues of law upon
a determination that there are no substantial issues of material
fact, with all doubts to be resolved in against the mover and
in favor of a trial on the merits.10 2 Nevertheless, a trial court
pressed by an overburdened docket is often unconsciously
tempted to grant the motion when the showing greatly pre-
ponderates against eventual recovery, even though this is an
inappropriate ruling when there remain disputed issues of
fact. For this reason, the number of appellate reversals usually
exceed the number of appellate affirmances of summary judg-
ments; but this year produced an even number of affirmances
and reversals. In at least fourteen instances during the reviewed
period the availability of the summary judgment as a remedy
was questioned, and in seven of these appeals summary judg-
100. 196 So.2d 668 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
101. LA. CODE! Civ. P. arts. 966-69 (1960).
102. Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963). See Smith v. Pre-
ferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 857, 860 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966): "The
federal decisions show that summary judgment is only rarely feasible in
negligence actions, where the standard of a reasonable man and issues of
negligence and contributory negligence present issues which usually cannot
be determined as a matter of law but only in the context of the total facts."
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ments were reversed because the appellate court found there
were disputed issues of material fact. 0 3
Of these decisions, some note might be given to Roy & Roy v.
Riddle,0 4 where the court pointed out that "the summary judg-
ment device is often not appropriate when based only upon the
defendant's uncontradicted affidavits negating subjective facts
material to decision of the case"'' 15 because then, by ex parte
affidavit, the movant is permitted to withdraw a witness from
cross-examination and from the fact-trier's demeanor-evaluation,
which may determine that the witness's verbal denial is never-
theless untrue. Viewed from this aspect, it is doubtful that sum-
mary judgment should have been affirmed in Henderson v.
Falgout,10 6 since it was based upon incidental subjective evalua-
tions in a deposition of a plaintiff concerning two nigh-simultane-
ous impacts. Summary judgment should not be allowed in bor-
derline cases or where the courts must strain to construe whether
the testimony shows factual controversy or not; as held by
Guichard v. Greenup,'07 even ambiguity in the showing defeats
the extra-ordinary judgment and relegates resolution of the
dispute to the normal trial on the merits. In Frank v. Great
American Ins. Co.0 8 the use of a summary judgment at the close
of the evidence at the trial was disapproved, as being beyond
the function of the device, which is to dispose of litigation with
undisputed facts prior to trial, not to serve as a motion for
directed verdict following it.
103. The seven reversals are: Frank v. Great American Indem. Co., 196
So.2d 50 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Burrus v. Guest House of Opelousas, Inc.,
195 So.2d 173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp.,
187 So.2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Schofield v. Durbin, 187 So.2d 743
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Guichard v. Greenup, 187 So.2d 516 (La. App: 4th
Cir. 1966); Roy & Roy v. Riddle, 187 So.2d 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Smith
v. Old Colony Ins. Corp., 187 So.2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). In addition,
the following seven affirmances occurred: Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal
District v. Farquhar, 196 So.2d 847 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Danton, 194 So.2d 466 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Elrod v.
Le Ny, 193 So.2d 299 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); LaBove v. American Employers
Ins. Co., 189 So.2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Henderson v. Falgout, 188
So.2d 208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Hibbert v. Mudd, 187 So.2d 503 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966); Delta Equipment & Constr. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 186 So.2d
454 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
104. 187 So.2d 492 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
105. Id. at 494.
106. 188 So.2d 208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). See also, Henderson v. Fal-
gout, 183 So.2d 675 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), where the opponent to the
motion had attempted to secure a remand to take depositions of witnesses
to show that material factual dispute existed.
107. 187 So.2d 516 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
108. 196 So.2d 50 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 739, 199
So.2d 180 (1967).
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Similar to the summary judgment remedy, the motion for
judgment on the pleadings provides a method to dispose of
litigation without a full-scale trial; in this instance when there
is no dispute as to the material allegations of fact.0 9 However,
of the three cases in which judgments on the pleadings were
allowed by the trial court during the period, on appeal two were
reversed because the remedy is unavailable when allegations
are denied by the opponent (for lack of sufficient information
or otherwise),110 whereas in the third case the issue of law
was determined differently by the appellate court on the basis
of the undisputed facts reflected by the well-pleaded and un-
denied allegations of the petition and answer."'
THE ANswER: AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
One article of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that
any affirmative defense must be specifically pleaded by the
answer, with the article listing certain affirmative defenses and
also applying to "any other matter constituting an affirmative
defense." 1 2 Jurisprudential applications make plain that affir-
mative defenses must be disregarded unless well pleaded in the
trial court.1 3 On the other hand, peremptory objections may
be pleaded any time, even on appeal, 114 and the Code article
which specifies recognized objections also states that the objec-
tions are not limited to those listed.1" 5
Query: May the same defense be raised either by the
peremptory objection or by the answer pleading it affirmatively?
The Third Circuit answered yes in the 1963 decision of Bowden v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 6 in a ruling approved by Dean
McMahon," 7 when the court held that compromise as a defense
may be raised in advance of the merits by the peremptory
objection of res judicata, as well as by affirmative defense
pleaded by the answer to be tried on the merits. During the
109. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 965, 968, 969 (1960).
110. Hygrade Investment Inc. v. Leonard, 197 So.2d 702 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967); Alexander v. Bates, 192 So.2d 186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
111. Succession of Killingsworth, 194 So.2d 331 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
112. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1005 (1960).
113. Landry v. Yarbrough, 199 So.2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Shingle-
decker v. Spencer, 193 So.2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
114. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 928, 2163 (1960).
115. Id. art. 927.
116. 150 So.2d 655 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
117. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-64 Term,
25 LA. L. REV. 291, 304 (1965).
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recent year the First Circuit held to the same effect in E. M.
Glynn, Inc. v. Duplantis,n 8 where the defense of illegality
of a contract was raised by the peremptory exception. Query:
Then, may what is usually pleaded as an affirmative defense
in the answer be raised in the appellate court by the peremp-
tory objection, when the pleader has overlooked pleading the
contention in the trial court? The appellate court in Penny v.
Bowden' 9 was faced with this question when the appellees on
appeal filed the peremptory exception urging an objection of
"laches"--however, since both parties agreed for the court to
consider the exception (which was sustained as to part of the
demand), the court was not required to make a definite ruling
on the issue.
Discharge in bankruptcy is one affirmative defense which
is waived unless specially pleaded.120 During the period under
review, in all five instances where the issue was raised, a debtor
had-following adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy-erro-
neously assumed that he could ignore pending or subsequently
filed suits involving debts listed in his bankruptcy schedule.
In each such instance, a small loan company was held to have
secured a valid judgment on the note because the debtor had
not pleaded his discharge prior to the judgment.1 12 In one
instance, the attorney for the bankrupt had secured a stay order
as to a pending suit, but the creditor nevertheless confirmed his
default judgment, without further notice to the defendant debtor,
when the bankruptcy stay order expired by its own terms upon
the debtor's discharge.12 2 These decisions are in accord with
existing law, although we may note that, if a discharge is ob-
tained after the judgment, it may then be pleaded in bar to the
judgment's enforcement. 128 Attorneys who secure discharges in
bankruptcy for clients may well wish to counsel them that the
discharge is not effective unless pleaded in any pending or
subsequent litigation seeking payment of the discharged debts.
118. 189 So.2d 84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), reversed on other grounds
(without discussion of the point), 250 La. 381, 196 So.2d 47 (1967).
119. Penny v. Bowden, 199 So.2d 345 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
120. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1005 (1960).
121. X-L Finance Co. v. Fenske, 197 So.2d 182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967);
Carpenter v. X-L Finance Co., 195 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Earl v.
Liberty Loan Corp. of West Monroe, Inc., 193 So.2d 280 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1966); Willoz v. Veterans Acceptance & Thrift, Inc., 188 So.2d 186 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966); Home Fin. Serv. Washington Parish, Inc. v. Taylor, 187 So.2d
778 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
122. X-L Finance Co. v. Fenske, 197 So.2d 182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
123. Louisiana Machinery Co. v. Passman, 158 So.2d 419 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963).
[Vol. XXVIII
1968] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1966-1967 413
OTHER PLEADINGS
Incidental Actions
The 1960 Code broadened the right of third persons to inter-
vene in pending litigation. 124 This is instanced by Boyd v. Done-
lon. 25 Neighboring homeowners were held entitled to intervene
in a suit to enjoin enforcement of zoning ordinances, whether
or not the judgment would result in provable direct pecuniary
gain or loss to them. However, Elrod v. Le Ny"26 illustrates
that the right is not so broadened as to permit intervention by
intermeddlers without real juridical interest in the outcome of
the suit. There, the court refused to allow a mortgage creditor
to intervene in a suit between mother and daughter to annul
an intra-familial sale, since the mortgage was in no way im-
periled by the outcome of the suit.
The reconventional demand was likewise broadened as a
remedy by the 1960 Code,'127 but Gruber v. Perkins128 and Davis
v. Bankston129 demonstrate that a litigant may not always assert
his claim by reconventional demand with the same confidence
of success as if claimed by principal demand. In Gruber, the
principal demand in tort had been filed within the prescriptive
year of the accident. Nevertheless, although based upon the
same accident, a reconventional demand was held to be pres-
cribed since filed after the expiration of the year. In Davis,
suit was filed by the mother of a minor. After her procedural
capacity to sue could no longer be questioned since not chal-
lenged by timely filed dilatory exception,lw° the defendant recon-
vened, asserting against the plaintiff a claim against the minor
arising out of the same accident. However, the court was unable
to afford relief against the plaintiff. Since exceptions to an inci-
dental action need not be pleaded (though they may),11 and
since all new matter urged by answer is deemed denied or
avoided without the necessity of replicatory pleading,1 2 the
court affirmed the dismissal of the reconventional demand by
sustaining an (unfiled) objection to the minor's procedural
124. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1091 (1960).
125. 193 So.2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
126. 193 So.2d 299 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
127. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1061-66 (1960).
128. 192 So.2d 222 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
129. 192 So.2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
130. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 855 (1960).
131. Id. art. 1034.
132. Id. art. 852.
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capacity to be used through his plaintiff mother, who was not
qualified as his tutrix.1  .
AMENDMENTS
During the year the amendment provisions of the New
Code8 4 were generally administered by the courts in accor-
dance with their spirit of affording liberal relief so as to effectuate
substantive rights. Thus, in Sharp v. St. Tammany Parish Hos-
pital'318 the court approved an oral amendment of the petition
at the trial to cure a technical objection to admissibility of
certain evidence, thus ignoring the overtechnical view that
written amendment is required.13 6 Again, in Breaux v. Co-Opera-
tive Cold Storage Builders, Inc.13 the defendant was permitted
during the trial to amend its answer of general denial so as
to allege specially certain defenses, the court finding the amend-
ment caused no prejudice to the plaintiffs and further indicat-
ing that, had there been any, such prejudice could have been
cured by granting a continuance along with allowance of the
amendment. Another decision permitted a plaintiff to file a sup-
plemental petition by amendment of his pleadings the day
before the trial to increase the amount demanded by an item
of damages,'3 there being no real prejudice resulting to the
opponent. Even where a defendant had failed to amend his
answer so as to obtain a base for admission of essential evidence
(to which the plaintiffs timely objected), although the appellate
court sustained the objection and reversed judgment in the
defendant's favor, it nevertheless remanded the proceedings for
amendment of the pleadings rather than render final judgment
on the merits against the defendant.18 9
There are some limits to these liberal amendment policies.
For instance, if an amendment introducing new issues is sought
133. Id. art. 732. However, the appellate court remanded so as to permit
amendment to secure appointment of an attorney through whom the recon-
ventional demand could be asserted against the minor, since a proper judg-
ment sustaining an exception should afford the opponent an opportunity
to cure a defect rather than dismiss the suit outright.
134. Id. arts. 1151-56.
135. 190 So.2d 500 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
136. This view was expressed by dicta in Bertucci Bros. Constr. Co. v.
Succession of Mitchell, 149 So.2d 675, (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), a decision
criticized therefor by Dean McMahon at 24 LA. L. REV. 300-01 (1964).
137. 187 So.2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
138. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hardcastle, 197 So.2d 335 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1967).
139. Smith v. Burks, 192 So.2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
1968] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1966-1967 415
after the case is tried and submitted for decision, the prejudice
to the opposing party (by causing an additional trial and per-
haps indefinite prolongation of the litigation) may outweigh
the procedural policies designed to be effectuated by liberal
allowance of amendment. 14  Again, in Brooks v. Fondren 41
the appellate court upheld the discretion of the trial court in
disallowing a supplemental petition. The pleading, for the first
time in the litigation, claimed damages for trauma-caused psy-
chiatric disorders, these being additional to those previously
demanded for merely physical injuries. Insofar as the appellate
court's opinion suggests that the amendment sought to inject
a new "cause of action" into the proceedings, it is simply errone-
ous, for an amendment which seeks greater damages arising
out of the same factual breach does not change the substance
of the original demand. 42 Insofar as the opinion implies that
the prayer to amend in order to demand these greater damages
was unduly prejudicial just before trial, the decision's correct-
ness is doubtful under the modern view 43 as to liberality in
allowing pre-trial amendment, in view of the usually sufficient
protection afforded an opponent by a continuance. The probable
explanation for the court's seeming illiberality in allowing
amendment is that the plaintiff, who desired to amend, did not
at the same time desire any continuance; thus, in view of this
unwillingness for a continuance so as to mitigate any prejudice
caused the defendant by this late amendment, the trial court's
exercise of its discretion to deny amendment could not be
considered unreasonable.
OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
Discovery
As instanced during the year,'4 4 a discovery order is usually
considered interlocutory and non-appealable, especially since to
140. Crisp v. Instantwhip-New Orleans, Inc., 196 So.2d 612 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1967). (The writer doubts that, in the cited case, the additional matter
was so different or new from that previously alleged as to justify the hold-
ing that permission of amendment would unduly prejudice the opponent.
However, the decision of the court is supported by respectable authority,
and the writer's comment may illustrate that the degree of prejudice is to
some extent a matter which may vary with individual context circumstances
within the discretion of the court charged with determining same.)
141. 199 So.2d 588 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
142. Breaux v. Laird, 230 La. 221, 88 So.2d 33 (1956).
143. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.3 (1965).
144. Anderson v. Southern Consumers Educational Foundation, 196 So.2d
686 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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countenance piecemeal appeals would contravene a basic pur-
pose of discovery to expedite the disposition of litigation. On
the other hand, the appellate courts will exercise their super-
visory jurisdiction to inquire into abuse of discovery practices.
They did so during the past year, on one occasion quashing
burdensome document-production requirements as unreason-
able,'145 on another to affirm a trial court's quashing as unreason-
able some burdensome written interrogatories, 146 on a third to
grant a trial continuance where the plaintiff had unreasonably
obstructed court-ordered discovery obtained by the defendants. 147
In Voisin v. Luke,148 our Supreme Court limited the use of a
request for an admission, a discovery device which provides
that such a request shall be deemed admitted unless denied
within fifteen days. 49 The court held that the device should not
be an irretrievable automatic admission forever preventing ad-
mission of evidence as to a controverted legal issue lying at the
heart of the case. The court pointed out that the essential and
limited function of the device is to eliminate the necessity of
producing evidence to prove uncontroverted facts, indicating
that it was not intended to be used as a trap by which the real
facts might be suppressed through carelessness or inattention
on the part of an opponent.
Jury Trial
With trial by jury becoming more prevalent in the state,
Huntsberry v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 50 provides a useful
clarification of the provisions regulating waiver of the right.
Under article 1732 of the Code of Civil Procedure a party waives
his right to trial by jury unless he makes demand therefor within
a specified delay. What happens when one party has demanded
jury trial and then seeks to withdraw such demand, over the
objection of the other party who in reliance upon the earlier
demand did not himself request jury trial within the statutory
delay? Huntsberry held that the initial demander cannot sub-
sequently withdraw his request to the prejudice of other parties
in the suit.
145. Moran v. City of New Orleans, 197 So.2d 203 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967).
146. State ex rel. Trice v. Barnett, 194 So.2d 452 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
147. Lindsey v. Escud6, 189 So.2d 465 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
148. 249 La. 796, 191 So.2d 503 (1966).
149. LA. CODF Civ. P. art. 1496 (1960).
150. 199 So.2d 196 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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Under the Louisiana Constitution our appellate courts review
facts as well as law,151 although at least lip-service is paid to
the doctrine that on review a finding of fact will not be dis-
turbed in the absence of manifest error.152 If no error is made
in the jury instructions or in the admission or rejection of
evidence, the manifest error rule obtains in favor of jury
verdicts, 5 3 although the appellate court will not hesitate to set
the jury verdict aside or modify it in the event it finds mani-
fest error. 54 However, when trial error is made in the instruc-
tions or in evidentiary ruling, one cannot say that the usual
assumption of the jury verdict's correctness should obtain. The
question then becomes: (a) Should the case be remanded for
new trial in order that the movant for jury trial secure one
despite the first trial's error?; or (b) Should instead the appel-
late court render judgment and avoid a remand, by ruling on
the evidence in the record, without affording the jury verdict
any benefit of the manifest error rule? As to this question, the
appellate courts divided during the reviewed year. The Fourth
Circuit remanded for a new trial.'55 The Third Circuit' 56 spe-
cifically adopted the contrary course (i.e., b) and rendered judg-
ment on the basis of its own factual evaluation of the record.
The Supreme Court denied review in both cases, for different
reasons.
Miscellaneous
Mayon v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.'57 set aside a judgment
adverse to a party who had incorrectly been denied instanter a
subpoena duces tecum during trial to secure probative evidence.
Several decisions of the year deal with the situation where a
case is fully tried but without transcription of the oral testi-
mony and the consequent limiting effect upon appellate
review,158 with one of the opinions extensively discussing to
151. LA. CONST., art. VII, §§ 10, 29.
152. Hardy, The Manifest Error Duty, 21 LA. L. Rsv. 749, 767 (1961); Tate,
Manifest Error, 22 LA. L. REv. 605 (1962).
153. Renz v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 138 So.2d 114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
154. Jones v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 198 So.2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1967).
155. Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 So.2d 330 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1966), cert. denied ("Judgment not final"), 250 La. 365, 195 So.2d 643 (1967).
156. Broussard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 111 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied (" . . the result is correct"), 249 La. 713, 190
So.2d 233 (1966).
157. Mayon v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 187 So.2d 767 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1966).
158. Plauche v. Derouen, 193 So.2d 918 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); National
Union Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 193 So.2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); So-Cam,
Inc. v. Atkins, 189 So.2d 742 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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what extent the trial court's written reasons for judgment may
be considered to supplement or limit the record under such cir-
cumstances.159 Loyola University, Radio WWL-TV Station v.
Lakeside Rambler Sales, Inc.16° set aside a default judgment on
the ground that the account proved by affidavit was not technical-
ly an "open account" (which by specific Code provision' 6 1 for
default-confirmation purposes may be so proved), because the
claim was based upon a particular contract to supply tele-
vision commercials on a monthly basis rather than upon simple
sales in the usual course of business. Nelkin v. Lomm 62 held
that procedural deficiencies as to the technical form of a motion
for a new trial did not destroy its efficacy as a procedural step
which, after timely filing and until overruled, tolls the delay
within which an appeal might be taken. Brewer v. Shiftett'6 8
underlines one of the rare technicalities of the new Code, that
which conditions a suspensive appeal upon a requirement that an
answer in an eviction proceeding be verified personally by the
party if he pleads an affirmative defense. 6 4 The appeal was dis-
missed because the answer had been verified by the party's
attorney, not by the party himself.
Court Costs
Overruling prior jurisprudence on the basis of a construc-
tion of a new constitutional provision, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held in Southern Constr. Co. v. Housing Authority,16 5 that
the authorization to sue a state agency includes with it a waiver
of the state's immunity from liability for court costs (as well
as for interest). In so doing, the high court apparently reversed
the intermediate court's holding 66 that the agency was liable
only for stenographer's costs by virtue of a statute' 67 exculpating
the state or its agencies from liability to pay court costs except
for a court reporter's fees. Several months earlier, however,
the high court had applied the statute so as to exculpate the state
159. Clement v. Perry, 194 So.2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
160. 199 So.2d 49 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
161. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1702 (1960).
162. Nelkin v. Lomm, 197 So.2d 709 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
163. Brewer v. Shiflett, 198 So.2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
164. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1935 (1960).
165. Southern Constr. Co. v. Housing Authority of the City of Opelousas,
250 La. 569, 197 So.2d 628 (1967).
166. Southern Constr. Co. v. Housing Authority, 189 So.2d 454 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966), reversed by Southern Constr. Co. v. Housing Authority of the
City of Opelousas, 250 La. 569, 197 So.2d 628 (1967).
167. LA. R.S. 13:4521 (1950) as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 509.
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highway department from liability for court costs assessed
against it by virtue of a judgment confirming a compromise
award in an expropriation suit.16S On the same decision day,
the court held in another decision 169 that the fees of the land-
owner's experts, not called to testify due to compromise of an
expropriation suit, were not taxable as "costs" per the judg-
ment approving the compromise, which assessed them against
the state agency. The court held that the fees of experts for
preparatory work in connection with testimony are not taxable
unless the experts are actually called to testify, even though
they are prevented from doing so by compromise or dismissal
of the suit. In so holding, the court apparently overlooked its
own prior decision interpreting a similar statute to contrary
effect.170 It is suggested that the two decisions during the year
which exculpated the highway department from liability for
costs assessed against it were oversolicitous of the state's
liability for the ordinary expenses of litigation and are thus
inconsistent with the broad ruling in Southern Constr. Co. v.
Housing Authority, initially referred to above.
To exculpate himself from any court costs whatsoever, a
defendant liable for all or part of the amount sought must, by
(waivable) dilatory exception of want of amicable demand,
unconditionally tender to the plaintiff the amount for which
he is liable.1 1 The defendant may also exonerate himself from
subsequent court costs by an unconditional tender at a later
stage of the proceedings. But in either event the offer of the
amount owed must be a real tender, 1 2 so that a tender condi-
tioned upon the creditor's release of a claim for a greater amount
is in reality only on offer of compromise and not such a tender
as will exonerate the debtor from liability for interest and
court costs upon the undisputed portion claimed.18 In excul-
pating the defendant from liability for court costs in Liwerant v.
168. State, through Dept. of Highways v. Reimers, 249 La. 1044, 192 So.2d
558 (1966).
169. State, through Dept. of Highways v. Salemi, 249 La. 1078, 193 So.2d
252 (1966).
170. Succession of Moody, 229 La. 30, 85 So.2d 20 (1955).
171. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 421, comment (d), and 926(3) (1960); Flourney
v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co., 173 La. 959, 139 So. 321 (1932); Nelligan v.
Musbach, 20 La. Ann. 547 (1868). See LA. CoD Cirv. P. art. 933, comment (b)
(1960).
172. LA. CWiv CODE arts. 2167-2169 (1870).
173. Succession of O'Keefe, 12 La. Ann. 246 (1857); Collins v. Employers'
Liab. Assur. Corp., 116 So.2d 851 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), and decisions therein
cited.
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Boston Ins. Co., 7 4 the court overlooked these principles. There,
the defendant's check tendered in payment contained the nota-
tion that it was offered in full settlement of a claim against
the defendant for a greater amount, so therefore it was not a
real tender. The two decisions cited by the court to justify its
action were not really in point. One 7 5 involved an unconditional
tender, the other 7" involved only the liability for legal interest
after a defendant had unconditionally admitted liability for part
of the amount demanded by the plaintiff.
APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Due to limitations of space, we will not discuss most of
the opinions deciding points of appellate procedure during the
year. One comment will be made, however. The number of
appeals dismissed for timely failure to file a bond reflects a not
infrequent misunderstanding of the bar in this connection.
So great is the ceremonial significance in Louisiana pro-
cedural law of a timely filing of the appeal bond required to
perfect an appeal that an appeal is a complete nullity unless
such is done, even though the appellant has paid the costs of the
appeal, payment of which the appeal bond is designed to secure.177
Additionally, by anachronistic survival a rule remains, not yet
overruled by the state Supreme Court, to the effect that the
amount of a devolutive appeal must be fixed by the trial court,
so that in the absence of this formal fixing a devolutive appeal
must be dismissed no matter how great the bond furnished, as
an appellate court felt forced to hold this year over a powerful
dissent. 7 8
In the context of this strict construction of provisions
requiring timely filing of bonds required to perfect appeals, it
is surprising to note the number of appeals which are dis-
missed because of what seems to be a not infrequent miscon-
struction of the delay period within which the bond must be
174. 198 So.2d 925 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
175. Gas Appliance Co. v. Hamlin Homes, Inc., 147 So.2d 228 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
176. Frey v. Fitzpatrick-Cromwell Co., 108 La. 125, 32 So. 437 (1902).
177. Orrell v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 248 La. 576, 180 So.2d
710 (1965).
178. Dupre v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 197 So.2d 119 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967). As a member of the court's majority, the writer reluctantly con-
curred with what he felt to be a correct appreciation of a harsh jurispruden-
tial rule.
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filed. Article 2087 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
an appeal must be perfected, by obtaining the order and furnish-
ing the security, within ninety days of the date the judgment
becomes final in the trial court by denial of a new trial or by
expiration of the delay to apply for one. Another article of the
Code 79 provides that, when the appeal is taken, the trial court
shall fix the return day "at not more than sixty days from the
date the appeal is granted." (Emphasis added.) In a number
of instances during the year, the appeal bond was not filed until
a few days of the return day; but this filing is too late if more
than ninety days after finality of the trial court judgment, and
the appeal must be dismissed.180 The ninety-day delay within
which the devolutive appeal bond must be filed is determined
in relation to the date of finality of the trial court judgment,




Change of venue provisions are based on the idea that a
defendant should not be tried in a parish where there is such
prejudice that a fair trial cannot be had. Prejudice will affect
witnesses, as well as jurors. The Louisiana Constitution recog-
nizes the power of the legislature to provide for change of venue,1
and statutory provisions for change of venue are set out in Title
XX of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure. State v. Mejia2
answers a number of important change of venue questions, some
of which are similarly settled in the new code provisions. Of
primary importance was the effect of the then operative limita-
tions that the transfer must be to "an adjoining parish of the
same judicial district, or to a parish of an adjoining district,"'3
and that a second change of venue could not be had "under any
pretence whatsoever. '4 In Mejia the original change of venue
179. LA. Crv. P. art. 2125 (1960).
180. Loftin v. Knost, 197 So.2d 910 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); McCrory v.
Link Belt Co., 195 So.2d 172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Burke v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 191 So.2d 691 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). See also Succes-
sion of Jackson, 198 So.2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Wilkerson v. Luneau,
198 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. 250 La. 518, 197 So.2d 73 (1967).
3. Former La. R.S. 15:293 (1950).
4. Id. 15:294.
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